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The solution is for people to learn to disregard the bound-
aries of this or that artificial “area” (or, indeed, this or that 
discipline) and simply follow the questions they are trying to 
answer wherever they lead (Susan Haack in Carrier, 2012).
The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is a multi-disciplinary academic field that draws 
from religious studies, sociology, cognitive psychology, anthropology, cognitive neuroscience, and 
evolutionary biology. In the last twenty-five years, CSR has anchored the study of religion in 
up-to-date scientific explanations of human cognitive architecture, offering a viable program of 
research to show how well-understood natural cognitive predispositions shape and constrain the 
mental representation and cultural distribution of religious beliefs (Barrett, 2007). While less 
than three decades ago there was no such thing as CSR, today it boasts dozens of authored and 
edited volumes as well as numerous academic centers featuring its a ivities. Findings from CSR 
have even attra ed the attention of the popular media, appearing in such places as The New York 
Times Magazine (Henig, 2007) and The Atlantic (Bloom, 2005). As with every other new disci-
pline, CSR has raised questions about the philosophical foundations and implications of such a 
scientific approach. Our aim in this dossier is to deal with some of the issues of methodology that 
have been raised with re ect to the scientific study of religion while exploring areas of contact 
between CSR and moral philosophy, folk psychology, epistemology, social cognition, and psycho-
pathology, among others.
The dossier opens with Twenty-five years in: Landmark empirical findings in the cognitive science 
of religion,1 in which Robert N. McCauley, one of the founders of CSR, reviews the most import-
ant experimental results of the field and critiques the methodological assumptions underlying it. 
According to McCauley, Religious Studies’ persisting exclusionary ethos has skewed the field in 
favor of the idiosyncratic over the recurrent, of the idiographic over the systematic, and of the 
interpretive over the explanatory—a tendency that has curbed innovation. McCauley defends 
the promise of the cognitive sciences for studying religion as a way to redress those imbalances, 
suggesting that greater attention to the recurrent, the systematic, and the explanatory will enrich, 
but not eliminate, our understandings and our inquiries.
In Evolutionary theory on the move: New per ectives on evolution in the cognitive science of 
religion, István Czachesz critically examines the use of evolutionary theory in CSR. After in-
vestigating the definition of evolution and describing the Modern Synthesis which reconciled 
Darwin’s theory of evolution and Mendel’s ideas on heredity in a joint framework, Czachesz 
considers various evolutionary per ectives in CSR, including evolutionary psychology, sexual 
1 Many thanks to Robert N. McCauley for offering to let us reprint his article here, as well as to Lalle 
Pursglove and Camilla Erskine at Bloomsbury Academic for their permission. The article was originally 
published as chapter 6 of McCauley and Lawson (2017) : MCCAULEY, R.N.; LAWSON, E.T. (cont.). 2017. 
Philosophical Foundations of the Cognitive Science of Religion: A Head Start. London, Bloomsbury 
Academic, 184 p. Available at: https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/philosophical-foundations-of-the-cog-
nitive-science-of-religion-9781350030312/  Reprinted with permission from Bloomsbury Academic.
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selection, gene-culture co-evolution, and cultural evolution. 
Finally, Czachesz turns to the problems with the Modern 
Synthesis and presents a new approach based on network 
theory, with potential applications to the study of biological 
and cultural systems.
In The cognitive science of religion: Implications for morality, 
John P. Teehan considers the moral role of religion in human 
evolutionary history and the insights that CSR provides into 
the continuing influence of religion in human affairs. After 
setting out the evolved cognitive bases of religious beliefs and 
behaviors, Teehan proposes that religions constitute moral 
worldviews that emerge from and tap into deep moral and 
emotional instincts. Teehan concludes that this makes reli-
gion, and moral worldviews more generally, profoundly im-
portant, but also dangerously problematic. Finally, he offers a 
case study of the intersection of religion, race, and politics in 
contemporary American Presidential politics to further ex-
plicate these ideas.
In Sorting through, and sorting out, anthropomorphism in 
CSR, K. Mitch Hodge reviews and discusses the various ways 
by which researchers in CSR have empirically demonstrat-
ed that neurotypical humans represent supernatural agents 
through the cognitive analogical processes of anthropomor-
phism. These include attributing to these agents a human-like 
mind, human-like physical and mental limitations, and hu-
man-like sociability. Hodge points to several problematic is-
sues that CSR must address, such as how to better demarcate 
when the folk is anthropomorphizing versus simply attribut-
ing agency, and how CSR’s declaration that the folk represents 
supernatural agents as disembodied minds places it at odds 
with a wealth of evidence to the contrary.
In Debunking and fully apt belief, Joshua C. Thurow con-
siders whether well-confirmed CSR theories can discredit 
religious beliefs. He employs Ernest Sosa’s theory of knowl-
edge as fully apt belief, which avoids objections that have been 
leveled against sensitivity and safety principles often used in 
debunking arguments. Thurow then sketches a plausible de-
bunking argument for religious belief on the assumption that 
religious belief is formed simply through processes theorized 
by CSR. However, Thurow points out that since most believ-
ers also rely on arguments of various other types, their beliefs 
are not thereby debunked.
In Predictive coding and religious belief, Hans Van Eyghen 
investigates the epistemic implications of a recent theory of 
religious cognition that draws on predictive coding. The the-
ory maintains that certain experiences are heavily shaped by 
a subject’s prior religious beliefs and thereby makes religious 
believers prone to detect invisible agents. In light of the new 
theory, Van Eyghen reformulates existing arguments based 
on older theories of religious cognition, namely, the unreli-
ability, unsafety, and naturalness arguments. He argues that 
the new theory does not adjudicate for or against the positive 
epistemic status of religious beliefs.
In Davidsonian semantic theory and cognitive science of re-
ligion, Mark Q. Gardiner and Steven Engler explore a tension 
between CSR and Donald Davidson’s view of first-person au-
thority, which stems from semantic holism: namely, that we 
know what is meant when we  eak in a way that we do not 
when others  eak. If CSR is correct that the causes of re-
ligious belief are located in cognitive processes in the mind/
brain, then religious insiders might have no idea what they are 
talking about: only the scholar of CSR would have a chance of 
knowing what they “really” mean. Gardiner and Engler argue 
that the solution to this problem is taking seriously semantic 
holism’s rejection of semantic bifurcation and thereby reject-
ing the idea that religious and non-religious language can be 
sharply distinguished.
In Shared rituals and religious beliefs, Daniel De Lu-
ca-Noronha asks what could explain the fact that agents are 
generally committed to performing a ions based on religious 
beliefs even when these are not obviously adaptive. After pre-
senting the cognitivist hypothesis which explains such com-
mitment on the basis of internal cognitive mechanisms, De 
Luca-Noronha offers objections that constrain that model’s 
explanatory power. He then examines Henrich’s proposal 
that the cultural learner commits to a given religious belief 
when she witnesses displays based on that belief in appropri-
ate situations. Finally, De Luca-Noronha argues that we can 
strengthen this insight by focusing on the shared chara er 
of the rituals that facilitate religious belief transmission and 
adopting an intera ionist model of social cognition.
Finally, in The acquisition of religious belief and the attri-
bution of delusion, José Eduardo Porcher explores the bound-
aries between religious belief and clinical delusion. After 
distinguishing between institutional and personal religious 
belief, Porcher reviews how CSR has accounted for cultural 
processes in the acquisition of institutional religious beliefs. 
He then presents the clinical definition of delusion, under-
lining the fact that it exempts cultural beliefs from clinical 
diagnosis, thus setting the stage for exploring cognitive mod-
els of the intuitive attribution of mental disorders. Porcher 
argues that even though some institutional religious beliefs 
may seem as strange as the most florid delusions, humans can 
readily recognize that they are not the product of mental dys-
function due to the fact that their acquisition and transmis-
sion is embedded within a cultural context.
Each in their own way, the essays that make up this 
dossier exemplify a welcome and growing trend of interdis-
ciplinary collaboration between philosophers and cognitive 
scientists which takes to heart Davidson’s adage: ‘there is no 
clear line between philosophy and science. Where there are 
no fixed boundaries only the timid never risk trespass’ (1980, 
p. 113). These contributions demonstrate that the collabora-
tion between philosophy and cognitive science is, at its best, a 
two-way street. Philosophy stands to gain because cognitive 
science offers a wealth of concrete examples with which to 
test theories in fields such as moral philosophy, epistemolo-
gy, and philosophy of mind (among others). In turn, cognitive 
science stands to gain from the employment of philosophical 
analysis through the clarification of concepts, the analysis of 
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empirical results, and, in the best case scenario, the assessment 
of the relationship between data and interpretation in order 




Faculdade Jesuíta de Filosofia e Teologia
References
BARRETT, J.L. 2007. Cognitive Science of Religion: What Is It 
and Why Is It? Religion Compass, 1(6):768-786. 
 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8171.2007.00042.x
BLOOM, P. 2005. Is God an Accident? Atlantic Monthly. Available 
at: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/
is-god-an-accident/304425/ Accessed on: 09/15/2018.
CARRIER, R. 2012. Interview with Susan Haack. Available at: 
http://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/1207. Accessed on: 
09/15/2018.
DAVIDSON, D. 1980. Mental events. In: N. BLOCK (ed.), Read-
ings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1. Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, p. 107-119.
HENIG, R. 2007. Darwin’s God. New York Times Sunday Mag-
azine. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/
magazine/04evolution.t.html Accessed on: 09/15/2018.
McCAULEY, R.N.; LAWSON, E.T. 2017. Philosophical Founda-
tions of the Cognitive Science of Religion: A Head Start. 
New York, Bloomsbury Academic, 184 p.
